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INTRODUCTION 
After September 11, 2001, news reports and organizations estimated 
there were tens of thousands of children left orphaned by the attacks.1  The 
New York Times reported that “secretaries at the New York State Office of 
Children and Family Services and press officers at [New York City’s] Ad-
ministration for Children’s Services could hardly answer the telephone 
without hearing from people who had read news of the many hundreds, 
even thousands of orphans left in need of a home by the September 11 dis-
aster.”2  “All were eagerly offering to adopt a World Trade Center or-
phan.”3  The Twin Towers Orphan Fund, established on September 13, 
2001, raised millions of dollars4 to provide long-term higher educational 
assistance and mental and physical health care assistance for the children 
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Bar Association Section of 
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 1. See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Orphaned by Terrorism—An Agonizing Road for Kids of 
Sept. 11, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1. 
 2. Nina Bernstein, A Nation Challenged: The Families; Thousands of Orphans?  An 
Urban Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at B1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. The 2007 financial report indicated that the fund had over seven million dollars in 
assets.  See TWIN TOWERS ORPHAN FUND, TWIN TOWERS ORPHAN FUND 2007 ANNUAL RE-
PORT, available at http://www.ttop.org/pdf/2007-ttof-annual-report.pdf. 
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orphaned by the attacks.5  It soon became apparent, however, that there 
were no “Twin Towers orphans.”  “Not a single child [needed] foster care 
or adoption by strangers.”6  In contrast, the state of New York at that time 
had 2,558 orphaned children eligible for adoption.7  While the imaginary 
orphans of September 11 elicited tremendous sympathy and charity, there 
was little outpouring of anger over the fate of children missing from foster 
care across the country.8  The reasons for the difference may lie in the way 
society views both poverty and the responsibility for children.  Simply put, 
society tends to view poverty as the fault of the poor.  The general view is 
that, in this land of plenty, no one is poor unless he wants to be poor.  In 
contrast, the “orphans” of the World Trade Center were not to blame for 
the September 11 attacks; as a result society felt responsible for them as a 
community. 
This view of poverty dominates many of our public policy choices—not 
only about children and their families, but about those individuals in 
need—and structures public commitment to, and responsibility for, the 
poor.  We often adopt approaches that place full responsibility on those 
least able to meet these demands because, as a society, we feel less com-
munal responsibility for the poor, who often are contradictorily portrayed 
as shiftless, lazy, criminal, and easily duped.9  For those proponents of a 
civil right to counsel, this view about poverty structures the debate con-
cerning the existence, nature, and extent of that right (that is, who gets a 
lawyer, what cases warrant the appointment of counsel, and who pays for 
 
 5. Twin Towers Orphan Fund Mission Statement, available at http://www.ttof.org/ 
html/mission.htm.  The Fund adopted a new charity in 2008 known as America’s Child, the 
mission of which is to provide “educational assistance and physical and mental healthcare 
assistance for the children of our military heroes: the fallen men and women who proudly 
sacrificed their lives fighting terrorism and whose strength and courage has kept our nation 
safe.”  America’s Child Mission Statement, available at http://www.americaschild.org/html/ 
mission.htm. 
 6. See Bernstein, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. By September 11, 2001, one child in foster care, Rilya Wilson, made headlines be-
cause she had been missing for months from her foster care placement before anyone dis-
covered she was gone.  Rilya Wilson was not the only child in state care who was gone; 
over 500 proved missing in Florida, 100 in Texas, 200 in Michigan, and 227 in Illinois.  In 
Los Angeles County alone, California could not locate 700 children.  Sally Kestin & Megan 
O’Matz, Missing Foster Kids Often Turn Up Dead, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 29, 2002, at 
1A. 
 9. The debate over welfare reform emphasized the view that poverty is the fault of the 
poor.  Newspaper accounts were replete with stories about welfare cheats, promiscuous 
mothers, and deadbeat dads.  Very little was said about the effects of welfare reform on 
children.  Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1225 (1999).  For a more recent discussion of welfare reform see Angela Ards, Welfare 
Family Values, 21 WOMEN’S REV. BOOKS 7 (2004). 
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the representative).  But it also alludes to a deeper question about what it 
means to be a good lawyer for the poor and the degree to which the lawyer 
must facilitate client autonomy. 
The extent to which the lawyer must accord the client autonomy remains 
a source of considerable debate.10  From one perspective, ethical lawyering 
must be client-centered and client-empowering; within this paradigm, the 
attorney is partisan, loyal, zealous, subordinate, and nonaccountable.  Dig-
nity, freedom, and individual autonomy are central features.  Under another 
view, however, the attorney is professionally independent of and perhaps 
even paternalistic toward the client, as well as morally accountable for the 
attorney’s own actions.  In this instance, notions of integrity are tied to 
larger concerns about the rights of others and an overarching duty to the 
principles of truth and justice.  For poverty lawyers, the dominant vision of 
the poor as somehow “disabled” and thus less capable of exercising the 
kind of autonomy required within the attorney-client relationship, may al-
low others to challenge the legitimacy of an attorney-client relationship in 
which client autonomy is primary. 
The kind of lawyering that occurs in juvenile court illustrates the chal-
lenges of client autonomy within the additional context of poverty.  Be-
cause children are entitled to counsel (and court-appointed counsel if indi-
gent) in delinquency cases as a matter of due process,11 children are 
entitled to be represented by lawyers.  For many lawyers, however, the idea 
that the attorney must advocate for the client’s express preferences when 
that client is a child runs counter to common sense.  Largely because the 
question of who gets to decide is inextricably linked to notions of compe-
tency and autonomy, the child client is peculiarly disadvantaged.  This em-
phasis on capacity suggests that the child may be incapable of making rea-
soned decisions and may thus be unduly susceptible to coercion and 
manipulation.  Although these difficulties often underlie justifications that 
deny the child access to counsel in the first instance, they also suggest that 
the attorney’s ethical obligations to the child client differ.  Thus, what the 
child wants may be subordinated to some vision of the child’s best interests 
and what is a “good” or “right” decision. 
It is this insistence on capacity that has structured much of our discus-
sion about rights and ethical issues in lawyering.  The dominant lawyering 
paradigms center on issues of client autonomy and lawyer independence—
on who gets to make decisions in a given case.  These models implicitly re-
 
 10. For a more complete discussion of that debate, see infra notes 15-76 and accompa-
nying text. 
 11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1967).  For a more complete discussion of Gault, see 
infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. 
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flect rights constructs that ultimately inform the lawyer about what she may 
or may not do for the client.  Moreover, rights theories themselves rest on 
some underlying notion about capacity as a prerequisite for having and ex-
ercising those rights.  “But because [certain groups] are not seen as capa-
ble, autonomous beings, much of our rights talk, and our lawyering, cannot 
accommodate them.”12 
Lawyering in juvenile court offers some lessons to those who seek to ex-
tend the right to counsel for the poor in civil cases.  Not only do juveniles 
in delinquency cases have the right to counsel as a constitutional matter, 
but that right is, explicitly, a civil right.13  Nevertheless, many juveniles are 
unrepresented in delinquency proceedings; advocates have had only mixed 
success in extending the right to counsel to other types of juvenile court 
cases.  Lawyers who are appointed to represent children often express con-
siderable confusion about their role, and the quality of their representation 
often is poor.  Furthermore, lawyers for children, even those with the best 
of intentions, may disempower and disable their clients. 
To understand how a good lawyering paradigm may nevertheless un-
dermine client empowerment and perpetuate disability, it is necessary to 
appreciate the larger ethical debate about client autonomy.  In the following 
section, this Article will examine two dominant models of good lawyering 
and explore their implications for client choice and lawyer autonomy, with 
an emphasis on poverty lawyering.  The Article then turns to a discussion 
of the lawyering experience in juvenile court to illustrate the ways in which 
dominant visions of the client as dependent, incompetent, and disabled af-
fect not only the role and responsibilities of the attorney for the child but 
the extension of the right to counsel itself.  Lastly, the lessons learned from 
lawyers for children are proffered to those who propound a civil right to 
counsel. 
I.  LAWYERING AND AUTONOMY 
Generally, there are two distinct and competing lawyering models;14 
both grapple with the question of client autonomy within the attorney-client 
relationship and the extent to which the lawyer must promote and serve 
client independence.  One model of good lawyering places greater value on 
 
 12. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Law-
yers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1656 
(1996). 
 13. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the implications of 
In re Gault. 
 14. See infra notes 15-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two competing 
paradigms. 
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lawyer autonomy, professional integrity, and the rights of others, while 
embracing a duty to promote the principles of truth and justice.15  Advo-
cates of this model reject the claim that client autonomy is of such value 
that the attorney acts morally when he engages in acts that promote the 
client’s ends without regard to the impact of the client’s express prefe-
rences on others; rather, the lawyer has broader obligations that render the 
attorney as morally accountable as a nonlawyer for the harms that may be 
caused to nonclients.16  From this perspective, the adversary system wrong-
ly exonerates the lawyer from moral accountability17 by authorizing the 
lawyer to engage in certain acts, on behalf of the client, that would be im-
moral if done for others outside that attorney-client relationship.18  Propo-
nents of lawyer autonomy thus claim that because the attorney is morally 
accountable for her actions, she must maintain her professional indepen-
dence.19 
A central concern for advocates of lawyer autonomy is how to be both a 
good lawyer and a good person.20  From this perspective, lawyering that 
emphasizes client autonomy may not only insulate the attorney from per-
sonal responsibility, but discourage the attorney’s direct and personal ex-
amination of the moral implications of her actions.21  Under a different 
view, however, moral independence promotes the goodness of lawyers who 
 
 15. See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND. 
L. REV. 717, 737-40 (1998) [hereinafter Luban, Noblesse Oblige] (arguing that a morally 
activist vision of lawyering has historical roots in a progressive view of the legal profes-
sion). 
 16. See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 118 
(David Luban ed., 1983) [hereinafter Luban, Adversary System Excuse]; David Luban, Par-
tisanship, Betrayal, and Autonomy in The Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen 
Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1990) [hereinafter Luban, Partisanship]; Peter 
Margulies, “Who Are You to Tell Me That?”: Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Non-
legal Issues and the Interests of Non Clients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213, 223-24 (1990); Thomas 
D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV. 439, 454 (1990); John 
K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann’s 
Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 794 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Pers-
pectives on Legal Practices, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 643 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Law-
yers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, Fall 1975, at 12. 
 17. See Luban, Adversary System Excuse, supra note 16, at 84; Luban, Partisanship, 
supra note 16, at 1019-20; Morris, supra note 16, at 788. 
 18. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 
CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1978); Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at 3. 
 19. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 454, 
493 (1981) [hereinafter Luban, Paternalism]; Thomas L. Shaffer, Legal Ethics and the 
Good Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 319, 329-30 (1987) [hereinafter Shaffer, Good Client]. 
 20. See Thomas L. Shaffer, On Thinking Theologically About Lawyers As Counselors, 
42 FLA. L. REV. 467, 468-69 (1990). 
 21. See Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 63, 73-81 (1980); Rhode, supra note 16, at 626. 
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must think about the moral consequences of facilitating client choice;22 in 
turn, this produces happier and more productive attorneys.23  Because the 
good lawyer may confront the client about the moral implications of the 
client’s actions, the attorney may seek justice by pursuing only those objec-
tives deemed right and fair, thereby fostering a more just legal system.24  
Furthermore, freeing the attorney to engage the client in a moral conversa-
tion promotes mutual interdependence and caring.25 
Within this construct, the attorney has considerable autonomy over both 
the means chosen and the ends pursued.26  While the moral lawyer may 
refuse to engage in any proposed course of conduct that violates her con-
science, she nevertheless must accept responsibility for those actions she 
chooses to undertake for the client.27  The attorney must make a judgment 
about the moral implications of the client’s goals (irrespective of the 
client’s legal right to pursue those objectives),28 grounded either in the 
lawyer’s own moral understanding,29 or in some sense of common morali-
ty.30  A moral conversation between lawyer and client is thus necessary to 
ascertain the client’s wishes and reconcile any conflicts between the law-
yer’s moral judgments and the client’s aims, in order to counsel the client 
about whether those actions are “right” or “wrong.”31  Such counseling 
may be explicitly client-centered in that it seeks only to enlighten and per-
 
 22. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 231, 252 (1979) [hereinafter Shaffer, Moral Discourse]; Shaffer, Good Client, supra 
note 19, at 329-30. 
 23. Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Law-
yers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 118 (1985); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers 
from Their Profession: Redefining the Lawyer’s Role, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 34 (1980). 
 24. Bastress, supra note 23, at 117; see also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1090 (1988). 
 25. See Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078, 
1079 (1979); Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 231-32. 
 26. See Bastress, supra note 23, at 113; Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1005. 
 27. Rhode, supra note 16, at 643; see also Richard K. Burke, “Truth in Lawyering”: An 
Essay on Lying and Deceit in the Practice of Law, 38 ARK. L. REV. 1, 22 (1984); Luban, 
Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1021. 
 28. See Rhode, supra note 16, at 644. 
 29. Bastress, supra note 23, at 114. 
 30. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 105 (1988); Luban, 
Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1023; see also Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at 10-11. 
 31. See Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1022, 1026; Morgan, supra note 16, at 
456; Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 235; see also Bastress, supra note 23, at 
98; Margulies, supra note 16, at 221-27 (discussing a model for counseling clients about 
moral implications of actions). 
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suade;32 however, it also opens the conversation to the possibilities of the 
client’s recognition of the immorality of her choice.33 
This vision of lawyering necessarily encourages certain paternalistic 
practices34 because it exhorts lawyers to shape and judge client objec-
tives.35  The underlying idea is a straightforward one: the lawyer may over-
ride client choice when it is for the client’s own good.  The notion of law-
yer as moral counselor is not new to the bar,36 nor is it unusual for lawyers 
to act independently of their clients in certain circumstances.  (For exam-
ple, courts have upheld lawyers’ decisions to override their clients’ prefe-
rences in tactical matters and the legal profession has sanctioned lawyer 
decision-making in other instances as well.)37  But proponents of this view 
contend that client autonomy itself has little, if any, inherent moral value—
that is, an autonomous action that is immoral is still wrong despite its auto-
nomous nature38—so refusing to further the client’s immoral purposes can-
not be morally objectionable simply because it impinges on client autono-
my.39 
Nevertheless, the lawyer should promote client autonomy when it is 
likely to facilitate client responsibility and moral action.40  So, if the auto-
nomous action is responsible (read: moral), then restricting the client’s 
choice would be an unjustifiable act of paternalism.41  This necessarily in-
volves moral discourse between lawyer and client,42 implying both the 
client’s readiness to receive moral influence and correction43 and the attor-
ney’s willingness to refuse to undertake certain actions on behalf of the 
 
 32. See Bastress, supra note 23, at 128; see also Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 
1026; Morgan, supra note 16, at 456. 
 33. See Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 247. 
 34. Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1036-37. 
 35. Luban, Noblesse Oblige, supra note 15, at 738. 
 36. Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1014. 
 37. Luban, Paternalism, supra note 19, at 458-59. 
 38. David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 639 (1986) [hereinafter Luban, Lysistratian Prerogative]; see 
also Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 19, at 328. 
 39. Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1037-38; see also Anthony D’Amato & Ed-
ward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 773 (1983) (arguing 
that moral rules cannot be eclipsed by nonmoral considerations; thus we should move away 
from autonomy, not move toward a socialist model of professional responsibility in which 
lawyer acts as an agent for the state); Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 19, at 328. 
 40. See Luban, Paternalism, supra note 19, at 474; see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden 
Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 770 (1990). 
 41. See Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1037-38. 
 42. See id. at 1038; Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 246. 
 43. See Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 246. 
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client.44  From this perspective, the good lawyer facilitates moral decision-
making by opening the client to the ethical ramifications of her actions,45 
and even possibly to a moral epiphany.46  Paternalistic it may be, but it 
nevertheless has moral worth.47 
In contrast, proponents of client autonomy contend that a good lawyer is 
client-centered and client-empowering; from this perspective, the attorney 
is loyal, zealous, and morally nonaccountable.48  Within the simplest ac-
count of this paradigm, client autonomy is “good” because it secures indi-
vidual dignity and freedom;49 thus the “good” lawyer promotes these val-
ues by facilitating client autonomy.50  Consequently, the attorney has 
certain obligations to the client, including duties of loyalty, partisanship, 
 
 44. See Shaffer, Good Client, supra note 19, at 329-30. 
 45. Shaffer, Moral Discourse, supra note 22, at 246. 
 46. Id. at 247. 
 47. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 
987 (1987) (observing that paternalism, stripped of its modern negative meaning, can por-
tray sympathy, familial feelings, and the virtues of a good parent). 
 48. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); 
RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILIP S.C. LEWIS, LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 
(1988); Monroe H. Freedman, The Lawyer Doesn’t Always Know Best, 7 HUM. RTS. 28 
(1978); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). 
 49. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS ETHICS 57 (1990) [hereinafter 
FREEDMAN, ETHICS] (Monroe Freedman has been one of the most ardent and articulate sup-
porters of this position); see D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 39, at 764; Freedman, supra 
note 48, at 31, 52; Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 
27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 204 (1978) [hereinafter Freedman, Personal Responsibility]; 
Fried, supra note 48, at 1074; Stephen L. Pepper, A Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A De-
fense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 616-17 (1986); 
Robert S. Redmount, Paternalism and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 
ANN. 127, 129, 132 (1989); Rhode, supra note 16, at 605; Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised 
Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 
339 (1987). 
 50. HAZARD, supra note 48, at 129; Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling 
Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 839 (1992) (recognizing that lawyers may empower their 
clients through such tactics as personalization); D’Amato & Eberle, supra note 39, at 763, 
764-65; Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 
ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 547-49 (1990) (discussing micro-arguments favoring a client-centered 
approach to legal counseling); William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Pow-
er: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1447, 1497 (1992) (acknowledging that power is fluid and that clients exercise power 
over their lawyers in a number of ways); Luban, Partisanship, supra note 16, at 1019 (criti-
que of the “standard conception” of lawyering); Strauss, supra note 49, at 338; Paul A. 
Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street Level Bureaucracy, 43 
HASTINGS L.J. 947, 951-54 (1992) [hereinafter Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering] (advocat-
ing a form of rebellious lawyering, in which the attorney seeks to empower subordinated 
clients); see also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 CO-
LUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988) and pro-
viding a more comprehensive account of the Luban-Ellmann debate). 
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zealous advocacy,51 and even a special-purpose friendship.52  Because au-
tonomy is a moral good and the promotion of autonomy depends, in large 
part, on access to law, the attorney is exempted from moral responsibility 
for the pursuit of the client’s stated ends.53  At best, this renders the attor-
ney’s role moral in and of itself because it promotes another moral act 
(client autonomy),54 even when the autonomous act may have a wrong or 
immoral consequence.55  At worst, the attorney’s role is simply amoral.56 
The client’s expression of autonomy primarily occurs within the attor-
ney-client relationship because the client accesses the legal system through 
her lawyer.57  The lawyer thus acts morally when she helps her client real-
ize legal rights,58 even when the client or the client’s objectives are morally 
suspect.59  On the other hand, if the lawyer preempts client decision-
making by denying the client the means to pursue lawful objectives, the 
lawyer may be held morally and professionally accountable60 because the 
lawyer deprives the client of her autonomy.61  Client autonomy neverthe-
less presupposes the capacity for rational choice.62  In its absence, the at-
torney may act paternalistically and there is no subsequent infringement on 
client autonomy because the client is not competent.63  The degree of client 
 
 51. FREEDMAN, ETHICS, supra note 49, at 65-66. 
 52. Fried, supra note 48, at 1071-72 (analogizing the role of a lawyer to that of a li-
mited-purpose friend who adopts the client’s interests as her own within the context of a 
(narrower) legal relationship). 
 53. Pepper, supra note 49, at 617. 
 54. Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 49, at 204; Freedman, supra note 48, 
at 52; Fried, supra note 48, at 1074; see also FREEDMAN, ETHICS, supra note 49, at 57. 
 55. Freedman, supra note 48, at 32-33; Fried, supra note 48, at 1082-87. 
 56. Pepper, supra note 49, at 617-19.  See Andrew L. Kaufman, A Commentary on Pep-
per’s “The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role”, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 651, 653-55 (1986) 
(critiquing Pepper’s claim that the lawyer’s role is amoral); see generally Luban, The Lysi-
stratian Prerogative, supra note 38; Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman 
and Luban, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657 (1986) (Pepper’s response). 
 57. See Dinerstein, supra note 50, at 514; Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra 
note 49, at 204; Fried, supra note 48, at 1073. 
 58. Fried, supra note 48, at 1075. 
 59. See Fried, supra note 48, at 1074-75; see also FREEDMAN, ETHICS, supra note 49, at 
57; Freedman, supra note 48, at 52; Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 49, at 
199, 204. 
 60. See Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 49, at 204; Freedman, supra note 
48, at 52. 
 61. See Freedman, Personal Responsibility, supra note 49, at 204, Freedman, supra note 
48, at 52. 
 62. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 726-29 (1987); 
Luban, Paternalism, supra note 19, at 462-65. 
 63. See Luban, Paternalism, supra note 19, at 465-66. 
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autonomy, thus, may depend significantly on the lawyer’s assessment of 
the client’s competence. 
Tying autonomy to competence provides more opportunity for lawyer 
manipulation, especially if the attorney conflates a “mistaken” or “poor” 
decision for an incompetent one.64  Within the context of poverty lawyer-
ing, for example, the construct of competence may disadvantage and dis-
empower certain client groups (like the poor), particularly if the clients’ po-
litical or moral beliefs serve as a basis for assessing the “rightness” (and 
thus competence) of their choices.65  Constructing the client as incompe-
tent, dependent, and “disabled”66 permits the lawyer to exercise dominance 
at the expense of client autonomy.67  Existing legal structures also may 
create systemic occasions for disempowerment by perpetuating this image 
of the client as incompetent.68  In this way, competence may become a con-
struct of a dominant viewpoint, narrowing the client’s exercise of autono-
my to the politically permissible.69 
But poverty lawyering also should promote individual empowerment.  
By welcoming client participation and ensuring collaborative decision-
making (through new interviewing and counseling methodologies, for ex-
ample), the good lawyer enables the client to exercise autonomy within the 
attorney-client relationship.70  This vision of client empowerment thus fos-
ters individual client autonomy by freeing the client to express personal 
goals to the lawyer.71  In turn, the good lawyer, cognizant of a legal hege-
mony that perpetuates inequality, empowers the client to challenge the sub-
ordination of law and to consider long-term rewards.72  This approach not 
 
 64. See Ellmann, supra note 62, at 769 & n.149.  For a more complete understanding of 
Ellmann’s position, see John Morris’s critique and Ellmann’s rejoinder.  Morris, supra note 
16; See also Stephen Ellmann, Manipulation by Client and Context: A Response to Profes-
sor Morris, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1003 (1987). 
 65. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Em-
powerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659, 670 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, An-
tinomies of Poverty Law]; see also Ellmann, supra note 62, at 770-71; Paul R. Tremblay, On 
Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent 
Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515, 537-39 (1987). 
 66. See Alfieri, supra note 50, at 773. 
 67. See id. at 811-12; Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 50, at 1449-50; Tremblay, supra 
note 65, at 554. 
 68. See Alfieri, supra note 50, at 812-15; Tremblay, supra note 65, at 552. 
 69. See Alfieri, supra note 50, at 811-12; Tremblay, supra note 65, at 554. 
 70. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of 
Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2147 (1991). 
 71. See Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 65, at 698-700; Tremblay, Rebel-
lious Lawyering, supra note 50, at 958-59.  For a summary of the modern and postmodern 
views of lawyering, see Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992). 
 72. See Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 65, at 701; Tremblay, Rebellious 
Lawyering, supra note 50, at 955, 959. 
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only advances the client’s goals but encourages the client to think about 
broader strategic objectives that may benefit others. 
The good lawyer thus may facilitate the collective empowerment of the 
entire client class.  The lawyer facilitates these seemingly disparate goals 
by empowering the client to agitate for rights vindicating the interests of 
the client class while pursuing the client’s individual claim within the con-
text of the specific case.73  Individual client empowerment promotes class-
consciousness and facilitates collectivist strategies for positive, long-term 
change74 through political communitarian agitation.75  Notwithstanding the 
emphasis on collectivist class rights, client autonomy is the primary goal of 
good lawyering because the client is still free to choose among competing 
rights demands.76  In respecting those choices, the good lawyer actually fa-
cilitates individual client autonomy by promoting class-consciousness, 
which has the potential to liberate individuals from subordinating practices, 
thereby enhancing individual dignity. 
The question of client autonomy and empowerment is an important one 
for those advocates of civil legal assistance.  While proponents of a civil 
right to counsel tend to focus—quite understandably—on securing such a 
right for the indigent, they have paid less attention to the ethical debate 
about what it means to be a good lawyer.  Lawyering in this context never-
theless raises practical questions about client competence, autonomy, and 
empowerment that need to be explored as these issues may themselves con-
tribute to an underlying resistance to extending the right to counsel in civil 
cases.  The need for counsel thus becomes attenuated when the client is 
seen as incapable of meaningfully participating in the attorney-client rela-
tionship.  This is not simply theoretical: the experience with lawyers for 
children in juvenile court suggests that the concern is real.  This Article 
next examines lawyering for children in juvenile court to illustrate and pro-
vide some additional insights into challenges facing the civil Gideon 
movement within the paradigm of good lawyering, client autonomy, and 
the role and responsibilities of counsel. 
II.  LAWYERING IN JUVENILE COURT 
The civil Gideon experiment began in juvenile court in 1967, when the 
United States Supreme Court decided In re Gault.77  The Court held, in 
 
 73. See Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 65, at 711-12. 
 74. See id.; Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 50, at 958-59. 
 75. See Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 65, at 711; Tremblay, Rebellious 
Lawyering, supra note 50, at 958. 
 76. See Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 50, at 958. 
 77. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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part, that in a delinquency case “which may result in commitment to an in-
stitution in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child and his par-
ents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel re-
tained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be 
appointed to represent the child.”78  Although the Court noted the quasi-
criminal nature of delinquency proceedings, the Court did not extend the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to minors, but instead chose to ground 
the right to counsel in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  Noting that “[d]ue process of law is the primary and indispensable 
foundation of individual freedom”79 and an essential check on governmen-
tal power,80 the Court made clear that “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance 
of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the 
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether 
he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”81  Notwithstanding this 
seemingly clear statement, the Court’s opinion subsequently engendered a 
vigorous scholarly debate about the role and responsibilities of counsel for 
the child.82 
The current weight of academic and professional opinion now clearly 
indicates that the attorney for the child is a zealous advocate for her client’s 
express preferences.83  Every state has a statute providing counsel for child-
ren in delinquency cases.84  Nevertheless, in practice there is considerable 
resistance to the notion that children are entitled to zealous, client-directed 
advocates.  Children routinely are unrepresented in delinquency proceed-
ings: many waive their right to counsel, based on either a lack of under-
standing about the significance of the charges and the consequences of pro-
ceeding without legal assistance, or as a result of pressure—subtle or 
otherwise—from the judge, court personnel, or their parents.85  When 
 
 78. Id. at 41. 
 79. Id. at 20. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 36. 
 82. See Elizabeth D. Dyson & Richard B. Dyson, Family Courts in the United States, 9 
J. FAM. L. 1, 58 (1969); Norman Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 
A.B.A. J. 811 (1967); Theodore McMillian & Dorothy L. McMurtry, The Role of the De-
fense Lawyer in the Juvenile Court—Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561, 
598 (1970); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 261-62. 
 83. Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and 
the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 255-57 
(2005). 
 84. Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court—A 
Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 383 (2008). 
 85. In 2001, the National Juvenile Defender Center, in collaboration with other national 
and state based experts, began conducting assessments of individual states to determine how 
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state courts were implementing the Gault mandate.  Sixteen states were studied between 
2001 and 2007.  Generally, the findings supported the conclusion that juvenile indigent de-
fense in various states was a patchwork of chaotic and underfunded delivery systems.  See, 
e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., THE CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN AS-
SESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PRO-
CEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA (2001) [hereinafter LA. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc. 
info/pdf/LAreport.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER 
CTR., ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF RE-
PRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN KENTUCKY (2002) [hereinafter KY. AS-
SESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Kentucky_Assessment.pdf; AM. BAR 
ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO (2003) [hereinafter OHIO ASSESSMENT], available at http:www.njdc. 
info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATLANTIC 
JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY 
OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2002) [hereinafter VA. ASSESSMENT], 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%20Assessment.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATLANTIC JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., MARYLAND: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 
(2003) [hereinafter MD. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mdreport.pdf; 
AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., MONTANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL 
AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003) [hereinafter 
MONT. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mtreport.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N 
JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & NEW ENGLAND JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MAINE: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEED-
INGS (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mereport.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE 
JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS (2000) 
[hereinafter TEX. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf; 
AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GEORGIA: AN AS-
SESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PRO-
CEEDINGS (2001) [hereinafter GA. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
georgia.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., NORTH 
CAROLINA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ncreport.pdf; 
ELIZABETH M. CALVIN, AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER 
CTR. & NW. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., WASHINGTON: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUN-
SEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003) [hereinafter 
WASH. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/wareport.pdf; CATHERYN 
CRAWFORD, CHILDREN & FAMILY JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., ILLINOIS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS 
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2007), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/illinois_assessment.pdf; ELIZABETH GLADDEN KEHOE, 
NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & KIM BROOKS TUNDY, CENT. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., 
INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DE-
LINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2006) [hereinafter IND. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www. 
njdc.info/pdf/Indiana%20Assessment.pdf; LAVAL S. MILLER-WILSON, JUVENILE LAW CTR., 
PENNSYLVANIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION 
IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2003) [hereinafter PA. ASSESSMENT], available at http:// 
www.jlc.org/files/publications/paassessment.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L JUVENILE DE-
FENDER CTR. ET AL., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF 
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS (2007), available at http://www.njdc.info/ 
pdf/mississippi_assessment.pdf; PATRICIA PURITZ, NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR. & 
CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 
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children do assert their right to counsel, they nevertheless may be ineligible 
to receive free legal assistance because of extremely narrow definitions of 
indigency that exclude many families who fall well below the poverty 
line.86  This may leave parents in the untenable position of having to 
choose between retaining legal counsel and providing basic necessities; but 
even once the decision to secure legal assistance is made, the process of ob-
taining court-appointed counsel may be so confusing and time-consuming 
that children still appear in court without representation.87  On the other 
hand, many parents, regardless of their socioeconomic status, may simply 
be unwilling to hire private lawyers because they are angry, confused about 
the need for counsel, or do not understand the consequences of a juvenile 
delinquency adjudication.88 
Securing appointed counsel, however, does not ensure highly skilled, 
competent, and zealous representation.  Perhaps in part because Gault ex-
tended the right to counsel only to the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency 
proceeding,89 lawyers are seldom appointed to represent children at initial 
proceedings or detention hearings.90  Moreover, there is considerable evi-
dence that attorneys for children fail to investigate or file pretrial motions91 
 
(2006) [hereinafter FLA. ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20 
Assessment.pdf. 
 86. FLA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 33; PA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 46; TEX. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 17. 
 87. Mlyniec, supra note 84, at 382-83. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).  The Court stated: 
We do not . . . consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the to-
tality or the relationship of the juvenile and the state.  We do not even consider the 
entire process relating to juvenile “delinquents.”  For example, we are not here 
concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-
judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention to the post-
adjudicative dispositional process. 
Id. 
 90. KY. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 29 (finding that most defenders are not ap-
pointed until the detention hearing and do not meet clients until adjudication); OHIO AS-
SESSMENT, supra note 85, at 25 (finding that only 10% of attorneys and 22% of judges say 
counsel is appointed at the detention hearing stage in their jurisdiction); VA. ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 85, at 21 (stating that the law does not require that defenders be appointed at ar-
rest, intake, initial detention hearings, or arraignments); MD. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 
30 (describing defenders routinely meeting clients for the first time at adjudication); TEX. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 18 (noting how some children get counsel at first hearing, 
but many wait weeks for their appointed counsel); WASH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 29 
(stating that in some counties counsel is never present, and in others counsel is rarely 
present); FLA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 34 (suggesting that appointing counsel at first 
hearing is resorted to as a second choice for judges). 
 91. LA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 66; KY. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 29; VA. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 25; MD. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 30-31; TEX. AS-
SESSMENT, supra note 85, at 21; GA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 26; IND. ASSESSMENT, 
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and provide little or no assistance during or after the dispositional hear-
ings.92  Systemic problems—such as crippling caseloads, little to no train-
ing, resource constraints, and poor pay—further depress the quality of re-
presentation.93  Additionally, court culture may create a set of expectations 
and norms that pressure lawyers into acting as best-interests advisors rather 
than as zealous advocates for their clients’ express preferences.94  Lawyers 
and judges themselves devalue the work done in juvenile court, seeing it as 
a mere stepping stone95 to “better”—and higher-paying—positions. 
Extending Gault’s right to counsel mandate beyond delinquency pro-
ceedings has met with considerable resistance and mixed success.  In abuse 
and neglect proceedings, for example, thirty-six states and the District of 
Columbia require the appointment of counsel for the child.96  Nevertheless, 
only seventeen states mandate that the lawyer be bound by the client’s ex-
press preferences and directives,97 and even fewer have held that the ap-
pointment of counsel is mandated by state constitutional law.98  Whether a 
child should have counsel in these cases at all, and what the role of the 
lawyer should be, continue to be subjects of considerable (and heated) de-
bate.99  In status offense proceedings, children have a statutory right to 
 
supra note 85, at 36; PA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 50-51; FLA. ASSESSMENT, supra 
note 85, at 34-35. 
 92. LA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 69-70; KY. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 30; 
OHIO ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 31-33; VA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 27-28; MD. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 33-34; MONT. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 29, 31; TEX. 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 14; GA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 16; IND. ASSESS-
MENT, supra note 85, at 38; PA. ASSESSMENT, supra note 85, at 51-54. 
 93. Mlyniec, supra note 84, at 400-07. 
 94. Id. at 407-09. 
 95. Id. at 407. 
 96. FIRST STAR, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FIRST STAR’S NATIONAL REPORT CARD 
ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR CHILDREN 5 (2007). 
 97. Id.; see, e.g., Representing Children Worldwide http://www.law.yale.edu/RCW/rcw/ 
summary.htm (follow “U.S. Summary Chart” hyperlink) (last visited July 17, 2009) (ap-
proximately seventeen states and two U.S. territories mandate the appointment of a child’s 
attorney); see also Representing Children Worldwide http://www.law.yale.edu/RCW/rcw/ 
jurisdictions/am_n/usa/united_states/frontpage.pdf (last visited July 17, 2009). 
 98. See, e.g., In re Williams, 805 N.E.2d 1110 (Ohio 2004) (holding that child who is 
the subject of a termination of parental rights proceeding has a right to independent counsel 
as a matter of due process). 
 99. For the most recent volley in this ongoing debate, see Barbara Ann Atwood, The 
Uniform Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act: 
Bridging the Divide Between Pragmatism and Idealism, 42 FAM. L.Q. 63 (2008) and Kathe-
rine Hunt Federle, Righting Wrongs: A Reply to the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform 
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Custody Proceedings Act, 42 FAM. L.Q. 
103 (2008). 
FEDERLE CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  12:06 PM 
108 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXVII 
counsel in a majority of the states,100 and at least one state supreme court is 
considering whether a child in a status offense proceeding has a right to 
counsel as a matter of due process.101  The extension of the right to counsel 
in these particular cases, however, may be the direct result of the increa-
singly punitive nature of these proceedings, rather than of a strong com-
mitment to a civil right to counsel.102 
This resistance to client-directed lawyering for children is in no small 
part attributable to an underlying doubt about children as autonomous and 
capable actors.  Dominant visions of children as irrational and less capable 
structure the attorney-client relationship in ways that undermine client au-
tonomy and promote lawyer independence.  In this sense, the lawyer for the 
child client may feel greater personal and moral responsibility for case de-
cisions and outcomes and, thus, may pursue certain goals that emphasize 
the client’s “best interests” over the client’s express preferences, especially 
when those preferences are viewed as “bad” or “wrong.”  This approach, of 
course, may prove self-serving: helping the child client fully realize the op-
tions and their consequences simply may take more time than the lawyer 
has or is willing to give.  Additionally, pressures from judges and court 
personnel, heavy caseloads, and poor pay may further erode a strong com-
mitment to client autonomy. 
 
 100. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-210 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316 (2009); CO-
LO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-105 (2009) (right to counsel mandatory except in truancy cases 
where appointment of counsel permitted but not required); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-87 
(2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-514 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4-1 (West 2009); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.060 (West 2009); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 607 (2009); MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-20 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29 
(West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.17c (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-
201 (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1413 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-272 (2009); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 62D.030 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-D:12 (2009); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 32A-3B-8 (West 2009) (mandatory appointment of counsel for children four-
teen or older); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 741 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2000 
(2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-26 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.352 (West 
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 24 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-31 (2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-30 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.101 (Vernon 2009); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1111 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5112 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 
16.1-266 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.32A.192 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 
49-5-8a (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-422 (2009). 
 101. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 199 P.3d 1010 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009) (holding due 
process demands child be represented at initial truancy hearing). 
 102. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4-1 (West 2009) (status offense is a delinquent 
act); see also Maria Grahn-Farley, A Child Perspective on the Juvenile Justice System, 6 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 297, 308 (2002).  For a discussion of how these issues may affect 
girls and minority youth differently, see Katherine Hunt Federle & Meda Chesney-Lind, 
Special Issues in Juvenile Justice: Gender, Race, and Ethnicity, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 165 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992). 
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Thus, even in the delinquency context, assessments of client competence 
provide significant opportunities for infringements on client autonomy.  
The attorney’s opinion that the client is making a foolish choice supports 
the lawyer’s conclusion that the child is incapable of considered judgment 
and thus authorizes the attorney to override client autonomy.  Moreover, if 
the lawyer believes she has some obligation to preserve the client’s future 
autonomy, she may adopt a role that seeks to promote the child’s needs, 
even when they may run counter to the child’s legal interests.  From this 
perspective, the lawyer may counsel the child client to accept responsibility 
for his wrongful acts or tell the client that she will not advocate for certain 
outcomes, even when those are legitimate legal options.  Other critics 
might go even further, arguing that a nonadversarial approach to the repre-
sentation of the child is a practical necessity because the child lacks the ca-
pacity to instruct his attorney. 
Because the right to and role of counsel in other juvenile court proceed-
ings—abuse and neglect, for example—is even less clear, claims of client 
incompetence not only permit opportunities for infringement on client au-
tonomy but may even serve to deny children counsel in the first instance.  
Thus, some critics contend that the child does not need independent repre-
sentation because the child’s interests will be adequately protected either 
by the attorneys for the parents or by the state.103  But even if the child does 
need independent representation, there is still significant disagreement 
about whether the child’s representative should be a lawyer or a guardian 
ad litem, the latter advocating for the child’s best interests rather than the 
child’s express preferences.104  For those who see a role for counsel, how-
ever, perceptions of client incompetence may permit significant incursions 
on client autonomy.  Consequently, the lawyer may act to “protect” the 
client from the client’s “ill-considered” choices by pursuing objectives at 
odds with the client’s express wishes. 
Whether lawyering for children should be client-directed implicates a 
larger ethical debate about what it means to be a good lawyer.  Thus, a par-
ticular lawyering model will dictate the extent to which the lawyer must be 
client-centered.  If client autonomy is highly valued, then a “good” lawyer 
would promote client independence over other principles.  On the other 
hand, if client autonomy is not a guiding principle, then the “good” lawyer 
may set aside client preferences when those directives do not comport with 
some other, more important value.  Problematically, an attorney may em-
 
 103. See, e.g., Donald N. Duquette & Sarah M. Ramsey, Representation of Children in 
Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective Represen-
tation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 347 (1987). 
 104. See Federle, Ethics of Empowerment, supra note 12, at 1677-88. 
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brace a particular lawyering model based less on a specific commitment to 
the model than on the lawyer’s view of the client and her abilities.  Some 
lawyers for children may fall into this kind of thinking, acting in ways that 
comport with the clients’ “best interests,” and advocating for the clients’ 
needs rather than the clients’ wants.105 
But the value of a client-directed lawyer for the child cannot be underes-
timated.  When the lawyer advocates for the child’s express preferences, 
she does so in the language of rights.  Rights have the potential to challenge 
political and legal hierarchies that have served to oppress and subordinate 
the interests of the rights holder106 by remedying powerlessness.107  Un-
derstood in this way, rights create a zone of respect and certain behavioral 
boundaries that discourage casual encroachment.108  Rights thus command 
the attention and respect of those with power while providing access to le-
gal and political fora in which rights claims may be heard and resolved.109 
Lawyering models that undermine client autonomy also undermine 
rights.  It is not enough to suggest that because children are incompetent, or 
otherwise disabled, they lack rights—for it is very clear that children do 
have rights: constitutional, statutory, procedural, and substantive.  Moreo-
ver, it is the lawyer for the child who is in the best position to insist that the 
child’s rights are respected, valued, and considered.  “The American con-
ception of justice is not simply encapsulated in the notion of Due Process, 
but is encapsulated in a notion of Due Process defined in terms of adver-
sarial presentation.”110  Because the American legal system is adversarial, 
counsel fills an indispensable role in ensuring that individual claimants are 
represented and that the requisites of due process are met.111 
Consequently, lawyering paradigms that turn on the competency of the 
client cannot adequately account for those individuals who may lack the 
requisite capabilities.  But a lawyering paradigm that facilitates the recogni-
 
 105. See id. 
 106. Katherine Hunt Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, 34 FAM. 
L.Q. 421, 437-38 (2000) [hereinafter Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protec-
tion]; Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving Cus-
tody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1597 (1994) [hereinafter 
Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places]. 
 107. See Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, supra note 106, at 437-
38; Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 106, at 1595. 
 108. See Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, supra note 106, at 438-
40; Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 106, at 1598. 
 109. See Federle, Children’s Rights and the Need for Protection, supra note 106, at 438-
40; Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places, supra note 106, at 1598-99. 
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tion of the rights of those who are marginalized has coherence.  From this 
perspective, client empowerment becomes the central value of good la-
wyering.  By recognizing that existing legal structures, as well as the attor-
ney-client relationship itself, may disempower the client, the good lawyer 
has an ethical obligation to free the client from subordinating lawyering 
practices that deny the client the ability to engage in autonomous decision-
making.  In turn, client empowerment may foster a truer collaboration with 
the lawyer because the client is free to engage in meaningful conversation 
with counsel. 
This particular approach also has the advantage of permitting the attor-
ney to challenge dominant visions of the client’s disabilities.  Thus, claims 
by powerful elites about powerless clients should be challenged because 
they are grounded in an incoherent account of rights.  By seeing relation-
ships in terms of dominance and subordination, a coherent account of rights 
reveals the ways in which the powerless are oppressed and marginalized.  
Rights thus have value because they allow challenges to those hierarchies 
and force elites to hear the claims of those without power.  The advantage 
of seeing rights in this way is the recognition of the rights claims of the op-
pressed. 
III.  LESSONS LEARNED 
There are three important lessons to be learned from the experience of 
lawyers in juvenile court.  First and foremost, even the Supreme Court’s 
finding of a constitutional right to counsel simply has not been enough to 
guarantee that children have access to legal assistance.  There is considera-
ble resistance to the notion that children in delinquency cases should have 
(or even need) attorneys, a resistance born of a stubborn belief in the juve-
nile court’s child-saving mission and knowing what is best for children.  
The second (and related) message is that the courts and legislatures gener-
ally have been renitent in extending the constitutional right to counsel to 
other types of proceedings.  The reluctance may be self-serving, since de-
nying children counsel in other types of proceedings is certainly cost-
effective (at least if one takes the short-term, narrow view), but it also re-
lates to an underlying belief that children do not need lawyers because they 
are incapable of articulating preferences that warrant serious consideration. 
The third and final lesson is that even when children do get lawyers, they 
do not get very good lawyers.  There are a number of systemic reasons for 
this.  The work may not always attract the best advocates because of low 
pay and low status.  On the other hand, heavy caseloads and limited re-
sources may make it virtually impossible for the attorney to devote the time 
and energy needed for the case, so the attorney simply does not do what 
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may need to be done.  Moreover, the system may simply discourage (or 
even reject) client-directed advocacy because the client is perceived as in-
competent.  This not only affects what the lawyer does (why file a motion 
suppressing evidence that may render the case unprosecutable when the 
child should face consequences for his or her actions?) but also permits 
greater opportunity for lawyer-driven decision-making that may override 
client directives (why not accept the imposition of court-ordered services 
that are “good” for the child even though the client does not want them?). 
For those who wish to extend a civil right to counsel for the poor, these 
lessons are critical.  Support must come from those most intimately in-
volved in the administration of justice—judges, lawyers, and court person-
nel—and cannot simply be imposed by a court or legislature.  There must 
be a sense that lawyers for the poor are good, not just for those who will 
have access to counsel but for the system itself.  Furthermore, notions in 
the civil Gideon community that only certain types of cases are sufficiently 
worthy of appointed counsel may bar poor clients from litigating issues that 
in retrospect would have raised some critical legal question or innovative 
legal position.  It also may set a disturbing precedent about who gets to de-
cide which cases (and, by proxy, which clients) are sufficiently important 
to warrant the commitment of state resources, thereby leaving that determi-
nation to dominant political viewpoints that could run counter (and often 
do) to the interests of the poor. 
Even if there is a civil right to counsel, our experience in juvenile court 
suggests that there must be a larger obligation to ensuring that those law-
yers are highly trained, competent, and valued.  While this depends, in part, 
on those in the system, it also means grappling with the ethical question 
about what it means to be a good lawyer.  We must directly confront our 
views about the poor and rethink the ways in which these perceptions allow 
us to construct images of clients as flawed, less capable, and less worthy of 
our respect.  By reimagining the client as competent and valued, we open 
lawyering to the possibility of client-directedness.  This commitment to 
client autonomy is essential if we hope to provide the poor with meaningful 
access to courts. 
Lawyering models implicitly engage in rights talk: what the lawyer is to 
do (or not) for the client depends primarily on how one constructs and val-
ues rights.  But these lawyering models rest on impoverished accounts of 
rights that fail to accommodate powerlessness.  A coherent theory of rights, 
however, recognizes the connection between powerlessness, hierarchy, and 
exclusion.  In this sense, rights flow downhill toward the least powerful in 
any given relationship and seek to remedy the exclusion and marginaliza-
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tion of the powerless through the redistribution of power.112  It is indisput-
ably good that the client’s voice is heard without a filter, not only because 
it gives the client a sense of having participated in the decision-making 
process but also because it adds a dimension to the court’s understanding of 
the facts that otherwise might be lost. 
Bluntly put, rights provide access to justice.  A client-directed lawyer is 
thus in the best position to ensure that the client’s voice is heard and taken 
seriously by facilitating client autonomy as a means to greater political em-
powerment.  Policymakers—politicians—know that the poor are powerless, 
and it appears that they are free to ignore certain issues affecting the poor 
as there appear to be few negative political consequences for doing so.  (In 
fact, the opposite may be true: they ignore the “problem” of the poor at 
their own peril, as the welfare-reform debate illustrated.)  Empowering the 
poor forces political and legal recognition and the simplest way to do that is 
to provide access to counsel. 
In short, the poor must be empowered in our society if they are to be 
respected and taken seriously.  Empowerment means letting the impove-
rished be active participants and stakeholders.  At bottom, it means rethink-
ing approaches that talk about the poor and enabling the poor to speak for 
themselves.  Lawyers are critical to this endeavor because they are a means 
by which the poor have access to justice.  At some point, we need to accept 
that communal responsibility for the impoverished in our society is not on-
ly morally right but socially responsible and fiscally sound.  How, then, do 
we move beyond notions that poverty is the fault of the poor?  I think the 
answer is straightforward—albeit not simple.  The voices of the poor, like 
those of children, need to be heard. 
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